Phenomenology and psychology: husserl’s project of an eidetic science of subjectivity

Abstract

This article investigates Husserl’s phenomenological proposal as a foundation for an eidetic and nomological Psychology, in contrast to the empirical models which have historically dominated their development. Drawing a line between Geometry and Physics, Husserl argues that Psychology needs a body of idealities to elevate them to the status of a rigorous science. In critical dialogue within Locke’s empiricism, the article analyzes how the notion of representation hinders access to the object, and how Phenomenology by carries out an intentional turn of consciousness, overcomes this limitation. Finally, the transcendental reduction is presented as a path to the original disclosure of the essence  of a consciousness life. This work points out Phenomenology understood as the ‘Geometry of lived experiences,’ as a horizon of meaning for the scientific reconstruction of the human sciences.