



## A STUDY ON THE STRUCTURE OF THINKING IN HUSSERL

### UM ESTUDO SOBRE A ESTRUTURA DO PENSAMENTO EM HUSSERL

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**Summary:** In this article, I present the Prolegomena, the Logical Investigations, Ideas I and II as parts of a coherent argument whose theme is the structure of thinking. Underlying the argument is the premise that knowledge of universals is possible. The fundamental ideas are (i) all knowledge is conducted by an intentional consciousness, (ii) all thinking is composed of intentional acts to which contents correspond, (iii) consciousness is a unity in continuous flux. In the Prolegomena, Husserl defines the object of investigation and the need to base knowledge of universals on experiences. In Investigations I-IV, he highlights the conditions for such an investigation. In the Fifth Investigation, he proposes elements of the structure of thinking. In the Sixth Investigation, he presents how it works. In Ideas I, he analyzes the structure of thinking and establishes the nomenclature. In Ideas II, Husserl presents how the structure of thinking is filled out and from it the constitution of essences takes place.

**Keywords:** Consciousness; Pure logic; Essences; Intersubjectivity; Teleology.

**Resumo:** Neste artigo, apresento os Prolegômenos, as Investigações Lógicas, as Ideias I e II como partes de um argumento coerente cujo tema é a estrutura do pensamento. Subjacente ao argumento está a premissa de que o conhecimento dos universais é possível. As ideias fundamentais são: (i) todo conhecimento é conduzido por uma consciência intencional; (ii) todo pensamento é composto de atos intencionais aos quais correspondem conteúdos; (iii) a consciência é uma unidade em fluxo contínuo. Nos Prolegômenos, Husserl define o objeto de investigação e a necessidade de fundamentar o conhecimento dos universais em experiências. Nas Investigações I a IV, ele destaca as condições para tal investigação. Na Quinta Investigação, ele propõe elementos da estrutura do pensamento. Na Sexta Investigação, ele apresenta como essa estrutura funciona. Em Ideias I, ele analisa a estrutura do pensamento e estabelece a nomenclatura. Em Ideias II, Husserl apresenta como a estrutura do pensamento é preenchida e como, a partir dela, ocorre a constituição das essências.

**Palavras-chave:** Consciência; Lógica Pura; Essências; Intersubjetividade; Teleologia.

## 1 Introduction

In this article, I present an interpretation of Husserl's texts, **Prolegomena, Logical Investigations, Ideas I and II**, as parts of the same coherent argument whose theme is the structure of thinking. In these texts, we can identify the constant presence of the premise that knowledge of universals is possible. The fundamental ideas are (i) all knowledge is conducted by an intentional consciousness, (ii) all thinking is composed of intentional acts to which intentional contents correspond (noesis, noema and noetic-

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noematic relations), (iii) consciousness is a unity in continuous flux linking past, present and future.

The argument begins in 1900 with the **Prolegomena to Pure Logic** (HUA XVIII) in which Husserl harshly criticizes the attempt to base knowledge of universals on empiricist, naturalist and psychologist premises and defines the idea of Pure Logic (or what I am calling the structure of thinking) as the object of investigation. Husserl circumscribes the problem to be solved, emphasizes the lack and need of a consistent foundation and begins to propose a structure of thinking that could allow the knowledge of universals.

This is followed in 1901 by the **Logical Investigations - Investigations into phenomenology and the theory of knowledge** (HUA XIX), where Husserl establishes the conditions for investigating the structure of thinking: (I) he begins with an analysis of language, expression and meaning, (II) he investigates theories of abstraction as insufficient ways to reach universals, (III) proposes mereology as a preparation for phenomenological investigation which, starting from the singular, aims to reach the universal, (IV) resumes the investigation into the limits of variation of meanings and language structured by a pure grammar as a suitable instrument for the investigation of universals, (V) unveils the pure self as intentional consciousness, the source of acts of consciousness and (VI) begins a phenomenological investigation into the most relevant acts of consciousness in the process of knowledge, the acts of signifying, intuiting, filling in, representing and knowing.

Having defined the problem, established the conditions and the fundamental concepts to investigate the structure of thinking, in 1913 Husserl published the second edition of Logical Investigations and the first edition of **Ideas for a pure phenomenology and for a phenomenological philosophy - Introduction to pure phenomenology (Ideas I)** (HUA III), where he proposed the appropriate attitude of knowledge to phenomenological investigation, the *epoché*. He takes experiences as his starting point and, applying the phenomenological method, reveals the structure of thinking: the acts of consciousness are always filled with a correspondent intentional content, it is the necessary relationship between noesis and noema.

At the same time as the publication of the second edition of Logical Investigations and the first edition of Ideas I, in 1912, Husserl completed the first manuscript of **Ideas for a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy - Phenomenological Investigations into the Constitution (Ideas II)** (HUA IV). Husserl directs attention from



acts of consciousness to the contents of acts of consciousness, from noesis to noema. He begins with ontic, natural, material, concrete, inanimate and animate fillings and then looks at the eidetic and ascending relationship between body and anima (*psyche*), spirit, empathy and the community of spirits.

Below I will analyze the texts mentioned in an attempt to highlight the presence of the premise underlying every argument, as well as the development of the three fundamental ideas. These ideas are already present in the Logical Investigations, especially in Investigations V and VI; in Ideas I, with an emphasis on investigating the subjective dimension of experiences, i.e. acts of consciousness; in Ideas II, with an emphasis on investigating the objective dimension of experiences, i.e. the content of acts of consciousness, the body, the world and others.

I use the expression 'structure of thinking' instead of pure logic because I want to emphasize the completion of this structure followed by the constitution of essences.

## **2 Logical Investigations, the problem and the conditions for investigating the structure of thinking**

### **2.1 Prolegomena, the problem**

In the Prolegomena, Husserl criticizes the attempt to base pure Logic, or what I'm calling the structure of thinking, on empiricism, naturalism and psychologism. I emphasize the first two chapters in which Husserl defines pure Logic as the object of investigation.

Husserl intends to unveil the foundation of the structure of thought and thereby to ground practical logic and the sciences. In other words, Husserl establishes relations of foundation: Pure Logic is the foundation of practical logic, and practical logic is the foundation of the sciences.

Science (HUA XVIII, 28-32) must have a delimited object of knowledge, a method of investigation appropriate to its object of knowledge and a criterion of truth. Science is more than mere knowledge, it is an orderly systematic unit whose aim is to achieve the greatest possible perfection in describing, explaining and understanding its object of knowledge.

It is the application of logic to science that guarantees the rigor and validity of scientific arguments and theories, functioning as a doctrine of science. It so happens that practical logic lacks a foundation; it lacks a pure and theoretical Logic to support it. To



put it another way, practical logic is normative, it says what should be and yet perhaps is not, it is a technique of thinking, it is applied, but it lacks a pure logic to serve as its foundation, a theoretical logic that describes being, the structure of thinking and is a priori.

Pure Logic (HUA XVIII, 33-34) as foundation of sciences must have (i) a rigid structure, (ii) be independent of will or chance and subject only to reason and order, that is, be a regulating law and, finally, (iii) this law must be universal and common to countless other foundations in order to delimit domains of knowledge, that is, must contain multiple and universal concepts of class that cover different scientific domains. This is why I use the expression 'structure of thinking', because this will be the foundation and guarantee for different types of knowledge.

The structure of thinking (HUA XVIII, 53-59) must have a theoretical content that is separable from all normalization, but which defines the fundamental value (the ultimate goal) and determines the unity of the discipline.

To this end, such an investigation depends on (I) clarifying the relationship between expression and signification, (II) reaching the ideal unity of meaning, (III) unveiling the relationship between the parts and the all, (IV) analyzing the underlying pure grammar, (V) reaching the intentional experiences of the pure I and, in describing them, (VI) going through the first steps of phenomenology. He begins by assuming a diligent, modest, honest and persistent philosophical attitude of "seeing things themselves" (§2) and applying the intuitive-descriptive method that makes it possible to describe objective idealities, or essences, from experiences.

## **2.2 Logical Investigations I to IV, language**

In the Introduction of the Logical Investigations, Husserl resumes his reasoning and emphasizes the need for a phenomenological investigation into the foundations of logic. It is up to phenomenology, based on logical experiences, to provide a descriptive understanding of essences and the connections of essence. To this end, Husserl establishes the necessary conditions for proposing a secure foundation for logic as universal knowledge. Since the objects of logic are ideal and not real, their laws apodictic and not general, language, taken as an instrument for revealing their essences, must have this power.



In the first four Logical Investigations, Husserl goes on to investigate the main tool of thinking, language. Language must be an instrument of eidetic analysis of the a priori structure of intentional consciousness to be filled in by the givenness of essences from experiences. After all, the structure of thinking and the ideality of its objects are accessible and knowable. It is not a question of discussing empirical grammar or the history of languages. The investigation falls on the experiences of thought and knowledge in search of directly captured essences and eidetic connections. The aim of phenomenology is to describe the essences and eidetic relationships that underpin the structure of thinking.

The first investigation focuses on the relationship between expression and signification, how signs refer to meanings and meanings refer to ideal units, the relationship between the act that gives meaning and the act that fills meaning, content as object, meaning and signification. It characterizes the acts that confer meaning at the limit of the ideal unit to which they refer. The role of intuition in clarifying meanings and knowing the truths based on them, the different levels of understanding and the distinction between apperception in expression and apperception in intuitive representation. The possible fluctuation of the meanings of words within the limits of ideal units. It investigates the phenomenological and ideal content of experiences of meaning, starting with the distinction between psychological and empirical content and eidetic and unitary content. The aim is to achieve an ideality of meanings, meanings in themselves.

The second investigation concludes the existence of universal objects accessible to consciousness through specific acts of consciousness. From the experience of meaningful expression, signification is apprehended in its individual and universal dimension, that is, signification *in specie* (§1). At the heart of this act of apprehending and specializing is signification *in specie*, the idea, the essence, the universal. Meaning in its universal dimension then becomes an object for consciousness. The species and the isolated case become evident, as does the multiplicity of isolated cases that fall under that species, for example, *the red* and the red of this house. In this way, it is not necessary to experience multiple cases in order to abstract universality by similarity, because it is not an empirical universality, but a metaphysical, eidetic universality, intuited from a single experience in which the essence is manifest. Husserl then goes on to denounce the inability of empirically-based theories of abstraction to describe these universal ideal units, as they result in nominalism or skepticism.



The third investigation is dedicated to mereology, the part of logic that studies the relationships between parts and wholes. Husserl reveals an eidetic connection between thinking and power, that is, thinking linked to the ideal objective necessity of not-being-able-to-be-otherwise. To the essence of such an objective necessity belongs a determined legality that conditions all singularities and the relations of these singularities as part of a whole that forbids being-in-another-way. This is an ideal or *a priori* necessity to which corresponds an ideal or *a priori* legality. In other words, eidetic connections governed by eidetic laws that establish the relationship between dependent and independent objects. Dependent objects are only cases of species, they are things of a finished kind, subject to certain laws of essence according to which they exist and only exist as part of a more comprehensive whole, for example, the coloring of this paper is a dependent moment of this paper (§7). The coloring is predestined to be a part and there is no other way for it to exist, it can only exist as a moment of something colored. Another way of putting it is that dependent objects cannot be represented by themselves.

The distinction between dependent and independent objects carries over to ideas (§7a). There is a sequence of ascending levels of ideas up to the supreme genus in a relationship of dependence and independence in which independent ideas can be incorporated into all more comprehensive ones. Independent content stands on its own, separates itself from the others around it, manages to form a unity; dependent content, on the other hand, is characterized as something given only on the basis of other independent contents. There are different types of dependence and for each there is an ideal legality that establishes, limits or prevents certain connections. For example, a sensible quality can only exist in a sensible field, a color can only exist in the visual sensible field and it can only exist as the quality of an extension.

If it were possible to think of the totality of these ideas, we would have the totality of pure essences, the essences of all possible individual *idealiter* objectivities (§11). To these essences correspond concepts that respect content, such as one, object, quality, relation, connection, multiplicity, number, order, whole, part, magnitude, etc. They are material categories to which a priori synthetic disciplines correspond, in which material ontologies are rooted.

Above these essences there are ideas empty of content, ontological-formal axioms part of formal ontologies to which correspond a priori analytical disciplines whose content is analytical laws. Analytical laws are unconditionally universal propositions, concepts and formal categories, and their particularizations result in analytical necessities.



Analytic necessary propositions have a truth that is totally independent of the particular mode of their objectivity or facticity (§12).

From the concept of analytic law and analytic necessity comes the concept of a priori synthetic law and a priori necessity. Synthetic laws are universal propositions, concepts and material categories and their particularizations result in synthetic necessities that include empirical particularizations.

Still in the third investigation, Husserl establishes the concepts of whole and part based on the relation of foundation. A content of type  $\alpha$  is founded on a content of type  $\beta$  when an  $\alpha$ , according to its essence, cannot exist without a  $\beta$  also existing (§21). In other words, the whole is a set of contents covered by a unitary foundation. In this whole, each content relates to another, directly or indirectly, through the foundation, i.e. they are fused together without external aid. On the other hand, there are essential separations of the whole since the parts are external to each other with their own links, founding new contents as forms that connect. For example, the whole *res materialis* is made up of *animate res materialis* and *inanimate res materialis*. All that truly unites are foundational relations and the unity of independent objects arises only because they share the same foundational unity.

The parts and the all are found in a sequence of foundation levels unified by ideal unities. In other words, the idea of unity or wholeness is based on that of foundation in a relationship governed by pure laws (or *a priori* or essence laws) that make the founded content dependent on the founding content. The laws for categorical forms are *a priori* analytical laws; the laws for contents (for materialities) are *a priori* synthetic laws. Each material whole is made up of material particularities founded on and united by an idea of a founding material unity, governed by *a priori* synthetic laws.

This mereological relationship is not only ontological, but also logical, since the categorical forms correspond to the form of thinking that indicates the correlate of a unity of seeing appropriate to the occasional objects of that whole.

The fourth investigation applies mereology to language. Husserl establishes the difference between dependent and independent significations, the relationship between the dependence of signification and the dependence of the object signified, the aprioristic laws of signification and the logical-grammatical doctrine that avoids meaninglessness and nonsense, in other words, he unveils pure grammar, the a priori structure of language. Based on the relationship between the independence and dependence of significations and the independence and dependence of the objects signified, Husserl points out that the



relationship between categorematic expressions and independent objects, and syncategorematic expressions and dependent objects is false. In fact, no syncategorematic signification, i.e. no act of dependent meaningful intention, can be in the function of knowledge except in connection with a categorematic signification. For the distinction between independent and dependent significations concerns the domain of the intention of signification and the fulfillment of signification, which implies that significations are under aprioristic laws that regulate their connections for the formation of new significations. In other words, the domain of singularities is limited *a priori*, there are laws of essence that regulate complementation for the formation of new meanings, that is, connections are subordinated to pure laws. It is possible to mix expressions arbitrarily and disorderly, but they will not have meaning. This impossibility is due to the essential genres under which expressions fall, their categories of meaning. For example, I can say: "this light expression is green; more intense is round; this house is the same, if the or is green, a tree is and". Categorematic and syncategorematic words and expressions can be placed side by side, but to have meaning they must observe the *a priori* laws of Pure Grammar.

Pure Grammar exposes the *a priori* constitution of the realm of significations, investigates in a doctrine of the forms of significations, the *a priori* system of formal structures, that is, of structures that are open to any and all material particularization of significations. It identifies the aprioristic legalities according to which significations, while maintaining an essential core, can be transformed into new significations. In other words, the task of a Pure Grammar is to investigate the legal-essential structure of significations and the laws, which are based on it, of the connection and modification of significations, reducing them to a minimum number of laws, primitive forms of independent significations, complete propositions and immanent articulations.

"With this legality, because it is an aprioristic and purely categorical legality, a fundamental and capital element of the constitution of 'theoretical reason' comes into scientific consciousness" (§13).

### **2.3 V Logical Investigation, elements of the structure of thinking**

Having presented the conditions for investigating and revealing the structure of thinking, in the 5th Investigation, Husserl goes on to analyze the first elements of the structure of thinking: intentional consciousness and acts of consciousness. Consciousness



is intentional and transcendental, it is the real unity of the experiences of the empirical self, it is the realization of experiences as the *locus* of the gathering of all psychic acts and contents lived in intentional experiences (§1). It is the task of phenomenology to perceive, realize, understand and describe this internal consciousness of the pure self.

The focus becomes the consciousness that experiences and the understanding of the experience. In this context, the experience is an experience for a consciousness, that is, any reference to empirical-real existence is excluded from the experience (§2). The focus is not on experience in its ipseity in the flesh, but on the appearances belonging to the structure of consciousness. For phenomenology, intentional experience brings together acts of perception, cognition, judgment (and the like) directed at events as integral elements of a unity of consciousness. The phenomenological "I" is therefore the unit connecting these experiences.

We are aware of the experiences and the contents experienced, an internal awareness, an internal perception that accompanies the present experiences. A perception intends an object as adequately present (or evident) and grasps it without rest, in what it is, as included in perceiving itself.

Thus, the pure I is the constant present in all experiences (Póltawski, 1974, p. 125), in all perceptions, the 'I am' is evident and the innumerable judgments through which I perceive this or that. The 'I' coexists with what is adequately perceived in each instant, it coexists with the reflexive act, it is continuously and unitarily connected to experiences, it is the unity of the phenomenological whole whose parts are moments. The "I" is the stream of consciousness as a unity that appears temporally (§6).

The "I" is the fundamental fact that must be given to us in direct intuition (§8). The first step is to subject the empirical "I" to a phenomenological analysis and, eliminating the body, to consider only the spiritual "I" as the source of acts of consciousness, acts in which anything appears, directed towards objects. The phenomenological core of the "I" is made up of acts that bring objects to consciousness. This is how self-perception occurs (Cairns, 2013, p. 164).

Consciousness is then analyzed as intentional experience, the source of intentional acts filled with intentional contents (Cairns, 2013, p. 84). Husserl goes on to analyze acts of consciousness and their eidetic relations, and the contents of acts of consciousness and their eidetic relations. I would highlight the distinction between the matter and quality of the descriptive content of the act.



The matter of the content of the act remains identically the same, it confers the relationship with the object; through matter is determined not only the object in general that the act aims at, but also the way in which it aims at it. The phenomenological content of the act resides in matter. Matter is the sense of object apprehension that underlies quality. The quality of the content of the act is an abstract moment of the act, which would be unthinkable apart from any and all matter. Quality determines whether what we are representing is intentionally present. For example, an equilateral triangle and an equiangular triangle have the same matter, they confer a relationship with the same object, but in a different way.

*[lived experience = act + content (matter → quality) ⇒ intentional essence]*

Alongside the intentional essence, Husserl presents the meaningful essence of the act, the ideational abstraction of meaning. It is possible to have different representations with the same meaning, for example, referring to a Euclidean space, I can say the shortest line between two points or I can say the straight line. The sense of apprehension is the same based on the same matter. Two representations are essentially the same when the same thing can be said about the thing represented and nothing more. This apprehended intentional essence does not exhaust the act, for example, fantasy shows itself in an inessential, essentially variable way.

The same happens with perception. We repeat perception on the same matter, on the same identical unit, the intentional essence is the same, but the visions and perceptions are different.

Husserl goes on to investigate the meaningful essence (meaning *in concreto*) of the act, the unity of meaning of the unity of objectivity, what in Ideas I he will call essence, the *cour* of the noema.

In the fifth investigation, the premise that knowledge of universals is possible is present as the driving force behind the investigation. Also are present the fundamental ideas of (i) intentional consciousness already in the first paragraph, (ii) the act of consciousness and its corresponding content (§10 and s.), although without the definitive nomenclature, and (iii) consciousness as a unity in continuous flux (§§5 and 6).

#### **2.4 VI Investigation, the functioning of the structure of thought**

In the 6th Investigation, revised and with additions when re-edited in 1913, Husserl carries out a phenomenological analysis of the acts of signifying, intuiting, filling



out, representing and knowing. In search for universality, Husserl analyzes the structure of thinking in operation through the acts of consciousness. This structure is dynamic, unitary and in permanent flux.

Husserl distinguishes between the act of signifying and the act of knowing (§7). In the context of lived experiences, knowing mediates the physical appearance of the word (sound or writing) and the intuition of the thing. For example, red names the red object that appears as a moment of red *in specie* and each red object that appears belongs to the same name thanks to the identical meaning. There is an eidetic relationship between the object, the name, the meaning and the identical sense.

Phenomenologically, we find the most intimate unity, an intentional unity. In both acts, signifying and knowing, where signifying constitutes the complete word and knowing constitutes the thing, they are intentionally linked to a unity of the act. So, we have "the name red calls the object red", or "the object red is recognized as red and, through this recognition, is called red". 'Calling red' and 'recognizing as red' are significant-identical expressions (§7).

*[name → meaning → object]*

Husserl describes the relationship between the expression and the intuition of the meaning in which the same word implies the universality of the meaning through its unitary sense, which makes it possible to encompass a multiplicity of ideally delimited intuitions. Thus, each of these intuitions can function as the basis of an act of nominal knowledge with the same meaning. For example:

*[shades of red → are named red → the name red refers to the same essence of meaning, i.e. it means red (expresses the idea red) → refers to red in specie → allows knowledge of what is red → the identifying synthesis of red → understanding of the concept red → allows recognition of other red objects].*

*[Lived experience → Meaning → IDEA → Concept → Recognition]*

According to Husserl, this reasoning also applies to proper names that refer to individual meanings, such as John or Berlin. The universality of the proper name and the proper signification has a totally different character to class names, because they always refer to the individual object, which is unique and the same, even if at different times and in different circumstances.

The acts of intuiting and filling in are therefore closely related. The act of intuition makes up the lived experience, is immediate and verifies an objective identity, an ideal unity, an essence. The act of filling in contains the intuited object and the thought object;



the aim of the act of filling in is to identify the more or less perfect identity that appears in it (§8).

In the sixth investigation, the premise of knowledge of universals pervades every paragraph in the elaboration of processes such as filling in (§13) and the investigation of a priori laws (§59 et seq.). Also, are present the fundamental ideas of (i) intentional consciousness (§8 and §39), (ii) the act of consciousness and its corresponding content (§9 and §53) and (iii) consciousness as a unity in continuous flux (§14 and Appendix).

Once Husserl has established the conditions for investigating the structure of thinking that includes an analysis of language, expression and meaning, a mereology, an investigation on consciousness and its most relevant acts to the process of knowledge, signifying, intuiting, filling in, representing and knowing, he is ready to advance and show how these acts function when filled with lived experiences that can lead to the comprehension of essences.

### **3 Ideas I, analysis of the structure of thinking**

In Ideas I, Husserl takes up the analysis of the structure of thinking of intentional consciousness. His aim is to access essences from lived experiences, since intentional consciousness is the source of acts of consciousness filled with lived experiences contents. In the natural attitude, essences and eidetic relations are intuited and, in the phenomenological attitude, applying the phenomenological method, essences and eidetic relations are described. In this work, the emphasis is on describing the essences and eidetic relations of acts of consciousness.

Husserl defines phenomenology as a descriptive science (HUA III, 133), and establishes its object of knowledge and its method. The essences of the lived [*der Erlebnisse*] and the phenomenological method, through reduction (§76), reveals the realm of consciousness as a protcategory of being in general (Póltawski, 1974, p. 125). In turn, the doctrine of categories must necessarily start from what is the most radical of all ontological differentiations, transcendental consciousness and transcendental world (Belousov, 2016, p. 24).

Given this distinction, the phenomenological reflection of Ideas I moves entirely in the transcendental dimension through acts of reflection (HUA III, 145-146). The objects of these acts of reflection are the lived experience. When the lived experience



becomes noticed, when reflection is directed towards it, the lived experience becomes an object for the I, the phenomenologist (HUA III, 148-149).

The interest of the phenomenologist is in a very specific part of this lived experience, the essence. A part that is only revealed when the phenomenological reduction is applied. When the phenomenological reduction is practiced, the findings placed in brackets become exemplary cases of universalities of essence. In other words, at first, he has unreflected lived experience; followed by a change on the attitude, he starts to perceive what he has lived; then, what he has lived becomes a reflected lived experience. There are various acts of reflection that can go through this lived experience, such as: immanent eidetic apprehension, immanent experience, recollection when the experience is a having-been-perceived in the past or expectation when the experience will be-perceived in the future. These modifications belong to each experience as possible ideal variations, ideal operations, modifications that can be reiterated *in infinitum*. However, only through reflexive acts of experience it is possible to know something of the flow of lived experiences and their necessary reference to the *pure I*, one and the same I, precisely because it can look at all the lived experiences in the flow (HUA III, 148-162).

This flow of lived experiences that belongs to a single *pure I* expresses a continuous and endless temporality. This horizon of lived experiences therefore takes place in a temporality, before, after and simultaneously, in a continuous progression from apprehension to apprehension, in which the *pure I* is the absolute and indubitable datum, an idea (HUA III, 162-165).

The lived experience given to a *pure I* is composed of a noetic dimension, the acts of consciousness, and its content, the noema. Thus, there are the act of perceiving and what is perceived as such; the act of remembering and what is remembered as such; the act of judging and what is judged as such. Put another way, the lived experience is made up of intentional lived experiences, acts of consciousness, noetic, and intentional correlates, the components of these acts, their contents, noematic. These contents, the components of the acts of consciousness, are in turn divided into real components of the lived and non-real - ideal - components of the lived, also called meaning (HUA III, 181-185).

Sense is immanently contained in the lived experience of perception, recollection or judgment; this is the idea that phenomenology aims to achieve and describe. Describing the idea, therefore, is not describing thought, but describing essence [*eidōs*]. The object



of description is the eidetic datum. In Ideas I, the emphasis is on describing the subjective dimension of experience, the act of consciousness and its eidetic relations and structure.

In Husserl's words:

All that is peculiar to the lived, in a purely immanent and reduced way, all that thought cannot draw from it, as it is in itself, and which in the eidetic orientation passes eo ipso into the eidos, is separated from all nature and all physics, no less than from all psychology, by abysses - and even this image, being naturalistic, is not strong enough to indicate the difference (HUA III, 184).

Thus, every intentional experience has a subjective dimension, the acts of consciousness, and an objective dimension, the intentional object. In the same way that the content of the intentional act can have a transcendental origin, it can also have a transcendental origin. In other words, the acts of consciousness themselves, their relations and eidetic structure can be the object of investigation and, as an object of knowledge, they also have an objective meaning, an essence and eidetic relations (HUA III, 185-190). With both the transcendent object and the transcendental object, the difficulty lies in maintaining attention on the actual object in parentheses given in the lived experience and not allowing consciousness to stray into the real object, but maintaining attention on the ideal object, reflected, reduced, retained by consciousness in the search for its essence and eidetic relations. This is because, although phenomenology admits or considers the real, transcendent thing, it takes it as a component of the phenomenon, as an element contained in the reduced phenomenon (Drummond, 2018).

Even if there are attentional changes and it is possible to privilege different aspects of what is experienced, the noematic core remains identical (HUA III, 190-192). It is also possible to admit changes in the noemes, as these may be necessary modulations of the way in which the identical occurs. Even so, within the full noema, it is necessary to separate different essential layers, which are grouped around a central core, the objective sense. This is possible because although the attentional configurations are eminently subjective, the objective reached by their range of attention is independent, placed only in reference to the self (HUA III, 193). In Husserl's words,

It is also up to a more detailed phenomenological study to ascertain, in the variable particularizations of a stable type of noema (for example, perception), what is required of them, in terms of the eidetic law, by the type itself, and what is required by the differentiating particularizations. But the requirement applies from one end to the other, there is no contingency in the sphere of essence, everything is linked by eidetic relations, in particular noesis and noema (HUA III, 193/194).



These intentional modifications affect the noema without affecting the identical noematic nucleus. Consequently, the ray of attention is not separated from the "I", but is itself and remains a ray of the "I". The "object" is reached, it is a target, placed only in reference to the "I", but it is not itself "subjective" (HUA III, 190-191).

It can thus be inferred that in both lower-level noeses, such as sensible perceptions, and higher-level noeses, such as moral judgments, there appears in the noematic composition, as a central nucleus, something made conscious as such, under the designation of meaning. In a phenomenological study, it is important to note in a type of noema what is required by the type itself and what is required by the differentiating particularizations. This is because, in the sphere of essences, in the study of the central nucleus of the noema, there is no contingency, and it is necessary to differentiate between what is required by the type and what is required by the particularization (HUA III, 193).

Put another way, in perceiving what is lived, reduction reveals the relationship between the real - hyletic and noetic - and the non-real or ideal - noematic (Drummond, 1990, p. 94). In the example offered by Husserl, a sensory experience, the sensitive perception of a tree, occurs as follows: on the one hand, the real unity of the experience, the color of the trunk of the tree, color as a sensitive stimulus, color as sensation; on the other, the unity of the noema, the continuous unity of a variable perceptual consciousness, the same identical color, in itself immutable. The real unity of the lived is made up of hyletic and noetic elements, it is the unity that reveals the individual as the same, material, concrete, which allows me to say "I see the same tree". The unity of the ideal is the unity of the noema that reveals the post-reduction essence (HUA III, 198-199).

There is also a third unity, the noetic-noematic unity, which links that object to a particular essence. In the post-reduction mode, the *eidōs* of the noema points to the *eidōs* of noetic consciousness, that is, they are eidetically interdependent, although they are independent.

A question arises: considering that noematic "objects" are evidently units brought to consciousness in the lived experience, but transcendent in relation to it, how can we elucidate the relationship between the real composition of the lived experience and what is conscious in it as an ideal, as an essence? (HUA III, 213)

The intentional object as such appears as the support for the noematic characters. All the noematic characters indicated have universal phenomenological scope, they constitute the necessary foundations of all intentional experiences, the same fundamental



genres and differences of characters are also found in all these founded experiences and, therefore, in all intentional experiences in general.

Correlated to the noematic characters, also called modes of being, there are noetic characters (HUA III, 214-215). For example, what is certain is perceptual belief; what is possible is supposition; what is probable is conjecture; what is problematic is questioning; what is doubtful is doubt; what is denied is denial; what is affirmed is affirmation or assent (HUA III, 215-221). Alongside these, there is an entirely particular experience of consciousness, neutralization (HUA III, 222). Neutralization is a modification of the sphere of belief that does not operate, does not cross out, does not underline, it refrains from operating, puts it in brackets, leaves it in abeyance. The character of the position is suspended. Belief, conjecture, negation and other noetic characters are neutralized and the correlates are there for consciousness, not in the effective mode, but "merely thought".

Neutrality and postulation are opposite but complementary attitudes (HUA III, 224). They are opposites because postulation is positional, it is evaluated by reason, it can be correct or not; neutrality or suspension is not positional, it cannot be evaluated by reason, it cannot be correct or incorrect. What is more, from effective consciousness, various positions can be drawn that are potentially included in it, effective positions; neutral consciousness does not contain any "real" predicate in itself. They are complementary because every actual experience ideally corresponds to a modification of neutralization. In this way, there are two fundamental possibilities in the way consciousness operates within the cogito: the effective, positional, authentic cogito, and the shadow, inauthentic, non-effectively positional cogito. It so happens that the effective operation and the neutral modification correspond to each other and yet they are not of the same essence, since when positional actuality is neutralized it becomes potentiality (HUA III, 228-232). Put another way, every perception has its background and this is a unity of potential positions. The background is the designation for changes in the gaze and potential "apprehensions". In other words, in the essence of every experience, a set of potential positions of being is delineated beforehand.

That is why it is possible to identify various intentional domains, to differentiate incipient or non-effected acts from actual acts, among which there are neutrality and positionality, the current and potential position. And even in the face of so many variables, the parallelism between noesis and noema permeates all intentional domains (HUA III, 236-237).



Up to this point, Husserl adopts examples of simple noeses, acts of perception. From then on, he turns his attention to noeses of feeling, desiring and willing (HUA III, 239-245). It may seem like a deviation in reasoning, but it is in the realm of affective consciousness that Husserl makes a clear passage from the particular to the universal.

These new noetic moments are matched by new noematic moments, the values. Values are not new determining parts of things, but values of things. In other words, in affective consciousness, the higher level noema - the value - is a nucleus of meaning surrounded by new tetic characters. In simpler terms, the thing does not have value, but it bears value and consciousness, in turn, is consciousness of possible value, the thing is only supposed to be valuable. Thus, apprehensions of value are related to apprehensions of things in the same way that new noematic characterizations (good, beautiful, etc.) are related to the modalities of belief. As Póltawski (1974, p. 150) remembers, “values actually, really exist, even though we cannot say that they are real in the sense in which chairs and tables are real”.

In affective consciousness, affective positional consciousness, acts correspond to contents, so acts of pleasure, wanting, desiring, valuing, acts of will in general, correspond to thematic characters. Underlying these thetical characters is an archontic thesis that unifies in itself and governs all the others, the supreme unity of the genus, the universality of essence. Hence the analogy between general logic, the general doctrine of value and ethics. These lead to the constitution of parallel universal and formal disciplines: logic, axiology and practice.

This is only possible because every thesis is subject to an eidetic law: every thesis, of whatever kind (including affective), can be transformed into an actual dyadic position. Therefore, any proposition (including desire) can be transformed into a dyadic proposition. It is as if there were dyadic modalities in all tetic characters (including evaluative ones). Consequently, every act or every correlate of an act harbors a logical aspect that can be explained logically thanks to the universality of essence. Otherwise, all acts in general (including acts of affectivity and will) are potentially objectifying.

A new question arises: how can this unity be promoted, given that lived experiences and acts of consciousness expand over time (HUA III, 246)? These lived experiences and their acts need to be unified in syntheses; syntheses operated by consciousness. Husserl identifies two types of synthesis: articulated synthesis and continuous synthesis. In articulated syntheses, the acts are linked in an act of a higher



order. In the continuous synthesis, unity belongs to the same level of ordering, there is no unifying act of a higher order.

Faced with the articulated syntheses of the lived, the possibility of transforming what one is aware of through many acts (politetics) into something that one is aware of simply through a single act (nomothetics) becomes evident (HUA III, 248-249). Thus, every noesis contributes to the constitution of a total object, or even, every consciousness in synthetic unity has a total object. Put more simply, a lived experience is made up of multiple acts and each act corresponds to a noema. To unify a lived experience is to achieve an articulated synthesis, to identify a higher-order act and its corresponding synthetic object, a total object. Or again, to intuit a total object implies a specific act of consciousness, because the ideal unity of the object could not be intuited by a dispersed multiplicity of particular acts (Moreland, 1989).

A synthesis depends on the character of the noeses, if all the sub-theses are positional, it is positional; if one is neutral, it is neutral. Thus, starting from the positional noeses, an articulated synthesis is carried out step by step. Position, apposition, presupposition, postposition etc. make up an articulated synthesis. It should be remembered that these noeses are radiations of the *pure "I"* as an original source of productions (HUA III, 253-255). It is an active I. Every thesis begins with a point of initiation (*fiat*), a first, spontaneous act, for example, making up one's mind or doing something voluntary. Every act can begin in this mode of spontaneity, a creative act, in which the *I think* makes its entry as a subject of spontaneity into a new flow of lived experiences.

This mode of initiation involves a need for essence, a modal change. This modal change does not imply losing everything that has been apprehended previously, no synthetic step is abandoned, but the mode of actuality essentially changes with a new original thematic actuality. This is because each type of noetic modification of actuality corresponds to a noematic modification of it. However, it is necessary to be careful, because although the mode of noematic actualization necessarily varies, the essence always remains.

In this brief study of Ideas I, it is evident the constant presence of the premise about the possibility of knowing universals, essences and eidetic relations; as well as the consistent elaboration of its fundamental ideas, intentional consciousness, the eidetic relation between acts of consciousness and the content of acts of consciousness - noesis and noema, and consciousness as a unity in continuous flux present in every lived



experience. These fundamental ideas permeate the entire argument, the presentation of the pure self, intentional consciousness in its cognitive or affective activity, consciousness as a source of perceptual acts whose content is perceptions or practical acts whose content is values, the eidetic relationship between noesis and noema in perceptual acts and in the practical acts of feeling, desiring and willing.

In the next step, Husserl turns his attention to the content of the acts of consciousness. He investigates nature and things in it, the body as the only instrument through which consciousness accesses the world, the animic and psychic reality, by analogy and empathy, the others, and the spiritual world.

#### **4 Ideas II, the fulfillment of thinking and the constitution of essences**

In Ideas II, Husserl starts from the same premise, the possibility of cognizing universals, and from the same fundamental ideas, intentional consciousness, acts of consciousness and their corresponding content, the noetic-noematic relationship, and consciousness as a unity in continuous flux. The difference is that the emphasis shifts to the noema, as stated in the subtitle: phenomenological investigations into constitution. From the completion of acts of consciousness, the aim is to constitute transcendent objectivities, essences (Crespo, 2009).

However, in Ideas I, Husserl recognizes that the constitution of transcendent objectivities in transcendental consciousness is a challenge for phenomenology, which he calls *Die funktionellen Probleme* (HUA III, 176). In Husserlian phenomenology, 'constituting' can take on two meanings, unveiling (HUA III, 176-177) and giving meaning (HUA III, 236/279). Both forms of constitution are inexorably driven and limited by essences and ontological regions; they are not arbitrary and voluntaristic procedures, the result of imagination or will.

The process of constitution begins with the fulfillment of thinking, ontic, natural, material, concrete, inanimate and animate fulfillments, and is then extended to the relations between body and anima (psyche), spirit, empathy, motivation, community of spirits and teleology.

Next, the constitution operates in two dimensions, separated only for didactic purposes, as one does not exist without the other. In the subjective dimension, acts of consciousness are limited by the noetic-noematic nexus that determines which acts are appropriate for each experience, capable of capturing and thinking about each object. In the objective dimension, initially inadequately apprehended data are determined by their



essence and, for greater clarity, eidetic variation operates according to its a priori prescribed modes (HUA III, 310-312), that is, the ontological region circumscribes a closed set of investigations subject to noematic determinations and relations, and its essence limits the possible variations (Cairns, 2013).

Another important aspect is that, in Ideas II, the emphasis is not only on constitution as an individual process, as an application of the phenomenological method by the philosopher in epoché, but on constitution as an intersubjective process. The process of constituting transcendent objectivities, the unveiling of essences and the giving of meanings, ceases to be solely transcendental and becomes the result of the connection between two transcendental consciousnesses that share the same lifeworld.

In this context, the body is the fundamental instrument in the process of constituting the material object, since it is through the body that the experience of nature, things and others is possible. The body mediates the relationship between consciousness and the world. Through the various bodily acts of consciousness, the acts of sensory perception, intentional and transcendental consciousness is able to achieve an aesthetic synthesis (HUA IV, 19-20) and unify the continuous multiplicity of sensible intuitions.

At this point, the body is not an object of knowledge, but a condition for the constitution of material objectivities. Things are given to the subject (through the body) as a unity in a spatio-temporal-causal nexus. In other words, sensations constitute the notes of the thing, for example, its colors, its circumstances and relations, such as causality (HUA IV, 57). The body is part of this nexus, it is the referential to which the world reveals itself, a system of subjective conditionality intertwined with a system of spatio-temporal causality (HUA IV, 64-65).

Husserl then distinguishes between two dimensions of the body. Körper (HUA IV, 154) is the body as something belonging to the world subject to the space-time-causal nexus, the external face of the body. Leib (HUA IV, 152-153) is the body as a perceptual organ connected to intentional and transcendental consciousness, the internal face of the body. The experience of an external stimulus, for example a tactile one, is captured through sensory perception, the physical contact of the hand touching the surface; this sensory stimulus causes a psychic (or soul or mental) impression. In this sense, Husserl distinguishes between körperliche Ausdehnung, a material expansion of the sensory stimulus, and Ausbreitung, sensory propagation of the sensory stimulus (HUA IV, 148-149).



The body is the only reality that can be moved by the subject, it is their physical center of reference and orientation in the world. The world presents itself to the subject through the body; in fact, the world presents itself to the body and the body presents the world to consciousness. Therefore, the body is not just a thing, but an organ of the spirit (HUA IV, 96).

Even in the face of this close connection between psyche and body, the giving of the psyche does not occur through the body, but as a unity of the flow of experiences, as a flow of consciousness, something with a specific essence that is independent of the body. The psyche differs from the body (i) in that it is in permanent alteration, being in essence a flow (HUA IV, 133); (ii) in that it is an infragmentable unity (HUA IV, 134). In Husserl's words:

We distinguish, always faithful to what is given to us intuitively, between the pure or transcendental Ego and the real psychic subject [reale seelische Subjekt], the psyche or soul, the identical psychic being which, connected in a real way with the respective human or animal body, makes up the double substantial-real being: the animal, the man or the brute (HUA IV, 120).

The relationship between body and psyche is therefore not a causal one, but a conditional one (HUA IV, 132), which varies according to circumstances. The psyche depends on the following circumstances: (i) psychophysical, dependent on the body; (ii) idiopsychic, dependent on itself and its internal circumstances; (iii) intersubjective (Nenon, 1996).

Furthermore, psyches have levels, as they differ qualitatively from species to species. The animal psyche (tierisch), for example, lacks the stratum of theoretical thought in the strict sense, characteristic of human subjects (HUA IV, 134-135).

The "I" is the same, an identical and functional subject in all the acts of the same stream of consciousness. It is the radiating center of all the life of consciousness, affections and actions, the polarity of acts (HUA IV, 105). Actions, emotions, states, qualities, attributes, interests, abilities and dispositions refer to a psychic unity (HUA IV, 93). This constancy in flux, this sameness in the midst of change, is the point of reference for experiences, the source of acts of consciousness and the center of identity.

Up to this point in the argument, the subject is in a naturalistic or theoretical attitude. In this attitude, the subject thinks in a natural-scientific way, looks for patterns, regularities, repeats, tries to list and control variables and measures. The researcher is in an attitude of knowledge, but still a natural-scientific attitude, not a phenomenological one. This is why he strives to dispel emotions and values with logical judgments and



abstractions from other values (HUA IV, 25-26). It is an active attitude that is not limited to a set of doxic acts (HUA IV, 3-4). The target can be individual or categorical, both of which are realized by higher-level acts (HUA IV, 6).

In this attitude, material objects are constituted, including objects of a psychic nature, animals and humans. Humans are given through the body in immediate apprehension, eidetic intuition that captures spiritual individuality, abilities, intellectual and practical competencies, their character and mentality (HUA IV, 139 in fine). There is also a positive point: the human subject is apprehended in its circumstances, in its cosmic context, in a relationship of dependence with its surroundings (HUA IV, 140). In his natural, theoretical, emotional and practical attitude, he is conditioned by things and by himself, conditioned physically-psychically and idiopsychically. However, this does not imply a determination, but only a necessary condition. For example, to play soccer, I must have the movement of my legs preserved (physio-psychic condition); to be a good footballer, I must have talent and discipline (idio-psychic condition); but even if I meet these two conditions, this does not imply that I will be a footballer. I quote Husserl:

On the one hand, it is now certainly clear that in the apprehension of the subject, with respect to all states of acts, psychopsychic and idiopsychic dependence is somehow assumed, but, on the other hand, in all the specifically personal contexts in which the personality manifests its personal properties, they, properly speaking, play no role. What is remarkable here is that we say that the psychic Ego and the personal Ego are, on their underlying basis, the same thing (HUA IV 141).

In other words, the reality of the person consists of possessing real properties, such as spiritual/personal properties, which have rule-based relationships with the body, the psyche and the surrounding world. On the other hand, physiopsychic and idiopsychic dependence is contemplated, but in relation to the various states of affairs in which the spirit (or personality) manifests its spiritual (or personalistic) properties, they [physiopsychic and idiopsychic dependencies] do not play a determining role, only a conditioning one.

There is yet another level of circumstances and dependence: the relationship with other people, person and community, person and social institutions, the State, customs, the law, the Church, etc. (HUA IV, 141). In the example above, we have the physiopsychic and idiopsychic conditions together, yet we still have to fight for equal opportunities to be a footballer (intersubjective condition).

This cosmic horizon, including things and others, is perceived as coded. The other is initially perceived as a body among things and, parallel to this perception, there is the



perception of coded horizons (Smith; McIntyre, 1982) . The world given to me is the same world given to the other, it is the same shared world. There is the original perception (Urpräsenz) and there is the corresponding perception as co-presence (Appräsenz). I capture his body and, at the same time, his circumstances, I capture the *alter ego* and the co-present horizon of the senses (HUA IV, 162-163) that surrounds us.

Thus, what was initially apprehended as a thing, then as an animated body, is now apprehended as similar to me; it is an apprehension by analogy (HUA IV, 168), a moment of empathy (Einfühlung) (HUA IV, 167). Empathy is an act of consciousness that happens when the ego experiences an encounter with another being. It is through the conscious act of empathy that I perceive the interpersonal world (HUA IV, 198). I understand my body and your body, here and there, in a co-presence of shared horizons. It is a community of spiritual subjects. At this point, the right attitude makes all the difference. In a naturalistic or theoretical attitude, the psyche is nothing more than an epiphenomenon (HUA IV, 175) and the surrounding world (Umwelt) is understood as the world of nature, the world of the natural sciences, the world of causality. In a spiritual attitude, the self and others are apprehended. It is in the experience of intersubjectivity that immaterial, spiritual, axiological objects, such as values and purposes, are fulfilled and constituted.

Although in an excessively summarized way, it is evident the consistent presence of the premise about the possibility of knowing universals, essences and eidetic relationships. In the same way, it is present the constant development of the fundamental ideas, the intentional consciousness that turns towards the world and others, the eidetic relationship between the acts of consciousness and the content of the acts of consciousness - noesis and noema - expanded to an intersubjective fulfillment and constitution, and consciousness as a unity in continuous flux present in each experience in a given context.

## 5 Conclusion

In this study, I try to show how, throughout the Prolegomena, Logical Investigations, Ideas I and Ideas II, Husserl constantly and coherently refers to a premise and three fundamental ideas. Husserl starts from the primary belief that knowledge of universals is possible and gradually builds his argument: first, he sets out the problem of basing knowledge of universals on empiricist, naturalist and psychologist premises; next, he establishes the cognitive conditions, proposes the attitude and method of investigation



appropriate to his object of knowledge; he then explains how universals are accessed by the continuous flow of intentional and transcendental consciousness, first in a natural attitude, and then in a phenomenological attitude; he describes how, from the fulfillment of acts of consciousness, it is possible to constitute, unveil and give meaning to essences and eidetic relations, first individually and then intersubjectively.

Throughout this argumentative path that runs through the three works mentioned, it is possible to perceive the underlying permanence of three fundamental ideas: (i) all knowledge is led by an intentional consciousness, (ii) all thinking is composed of intentional acts to which correspond intentional contents, noesis and name, noetic-noematic relationship, (iii) consciousness is a unity in continuous flux interconnecting all the experiences of the self in the past, present and future.

The interpretation that the Prolegomena, Logical Investigations, Ideas I and Ideas II are part of the same coherent argument is possible, not only because the texts were drafted and revised at the same time, between the years 1912/1913, which can be understood as evidence of Husserl's coherence, but because, as has been shown above, his premise and fundamental ideas are consistent throughout his works.

There is no need to talk about an idealist turn (Mohanty, 1974), because (i) consciousness is the foundation of objectivities and their meaning in the sense that it is the locus where the constitution of essences and eidetic relations takes place, in no way do universals depend on consciousness; (ii) the focus on the structures of consciousness is only part of the journey towards investigating the content of acts of consciousness, in fact, noesis is not possible without noema and vice versa; (iii) the observation of a natural attitude and the need to change to a phenomenological (or transcendental, i.e. suspension of judgment) attitude is part of the phenomenological method; (iv) putting the world in brackets does not imply denying it, on the contrary, it is what makes it possible to distinguish the contingent from the universal, it is a guarantee that we will reach what remains, the universals, essences and eidetic relations; (v) neither does it imply solipsism, because essences and eidetic relations are constituted intersubjectively.

Therefore, from the Prolegomena, through the Logical Investigations and Ideas I, to Ideas II, Husserl remains faithful to the idea that intentional and transcendental consciousness can know transcendent essences and eidetic relations. Husserl is therefore a realist (Drummond, 1988, p. 106; Ameriks, 1977). An ontological realist in the sense that essences and eidetic relations are independent of subjectivity. An epistemological realist because the subject, in a natural attitude, accesses essences and eidetic relations,



and, in a phenomenological attitude, is capable of constituting universals, unveiling them, describing them and giving them meaning.

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**Received:** June 30, 2025.

**Accepted:** November 26, 2025.